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EXPRESSIVE LAW AND OPPRESSIVE NORMS:  
A COMMENT ON RICHARD McADAMS’S “A FOCAL 
POINT THEORY OF EXPRESSIVE LAW” 
Amy L. Wax* 
I. THE PROBLEM OF “OPPRESSIVE” NORMS 
OW does law affect behavior? Scholars are not of one mind. 
The conventional “deterrence” or “instrumental” model1 
looks to the response to penalties and punishments imposed for 
violations of legal rules. People’s willingness to comply with the 
law’s commands stems from official threats to deprive them of 
something valuable by imposing financial liability, withdrawing 
privileges, throwing them in prison, or extracting fines.2 The sim-
plicity and testability of this theory account for its appeal and for 
the temptation to adopt its assumptions in analyzing particular 
problems. 
Another line of scholarship recognizes the model’s limitations. 
A theory of compliance that looks only to the response to sanctions 
and penalties cannot explain observed patterns of behavior. The 
scattershot nature of law enforcement predicts more widespread 
flouting of legal commands than is actually observed. It is fortu-
nate, however, that the deterrence theory fails to explain why most 
people obey the law. Were a credible threat of punishment all that 
worked to prevent violations of law, vastly greater investments in 
law enforcement and penalties would be needed to secure a tolera-
bly orderly society. 
The recent surge of interest in the expressive power of law 
represents an attempt to develop a more complete and sophisti-
 
* Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia Law 
School. Thanks to Chris Sanchirico and Paul Mahoney for excellent comments and 
suggestions. 
1 See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990). 
2 See, e.g., id. at 3 (arguing that the instrumental perspective views people “as 
shaping their behavior to respond to changes in the tangible, immediate incentives 
and penalties associated with following the law—[with] judgments about the personal 
gains and losses resulting from different kinds of behavior”). 
H 
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cated view of how law affects behavior. That the law can induce 
compliance wholly apart from its power to punish has strong intui-
tive appeal and comports with the evidence that a simple incentive 
model cannot explain everything. The challenge, however, is to de-
velop a plausible theory of how legal rules influence behavior. This 
requires a more sophisticated picture of human motivation and in-
teraction than is ordinarily presented by the instrumental view of 
law. 
Richard McAdams’s Article, “A Focal Point Theory of Expres-
sive Law,”3 represents a useful contribution to this effort. Key to 
his analysis is the understanding that the penalties the state im-
poses are not the only factors that influence individual reactions to 
legal rules. What government can do to us is often less important 
than what others will do to us in response to official pronounce-
ments. Therefore, in calculating the costs and benefits of a 
particular action, people must take into account other persons’ re-
actions to laws as well. What game theory adds to the instrumental 
model, then, is not a fundamental change in the assumption of self-
interested behavior, but a more sophisticated framework for pre-
dicting law’s effects based on a citizen’s complex interactions with 
others. 
Because of its usefulness in modeling a variety of social interac-
tions that the law might seek to regulate, the so-called “Chicken,” 
or Hawk-Dove game dominates McAdams’s discussion.4 This game 
captures the dynamics of many situations in which parties can 
benefit from cooperation but have incompatible claims to valuable 
resources. The hallmark of Hawk-Dove interactions is a payoff 
 
3 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2000). 
4 It looms large for other legal commentators as well. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, 
Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (1989); Robert Sugden, 
The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare 58–62 (1986); Joan Williams, 
Unbending Gender (2000); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and 
Losing, 78 Va. L. Rev. 421, 428 (1992) (referring to a zero sum game); Amy L. Wax, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 
84 Va. L. Rev. 509, 556–57 (1998); Paul Mahoney & Chris Sanchirico, Competing 
Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient? (May 1, 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association), 
available on the Social Science Research Network, http://www.ssrn.com, as Legal 
Studies Working Paper No. 00-15; Randal C. Picker, Endogenous Neighborhoods and 
Norms (Feb. 7, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review 
Association); Eric Posner, The Evolution of Constitutions 5 (Feb. 28, 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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scheme that generates a characteristic order of preference for 
combinations of moves. The first choice for each player is to assert 
his claim (dominate or play Hawk) while the other yields (submits 
or plays Dove). Barring that, a player prefers to yield while the 
other does as well (that is both play Dove). Next in line is deferring 
to the other player (the Dove/Hawk combination). Dead last is the 
prospect of conflict, in which both assert their claim simultane-
ously. Because conflict results in the smallest gain or the greatest 
loss for each player compared to other combinations, it is best 
avoided. 
The expressive role for law put forward by McAdams depends 
crucially on a key characteristic of the types of Hawk-Dove games 
that are the centerpiece of his Article. In these games, there is no 
single “pure” strategy of play that is best for all players and from 
which no player has an incentive to deviate. There is no unique 
Nash equilibrium because there is no one uniform strategy for each 
player that is the best reply to itself.5 By creating a focal point, or 
“asymmetry” as McAdams calls it, around which players can coor-
dinate their moves, the law helps private actors settle into one 
“pure-strategy” equilibrium for playing the game. That equilibrium 
enables players to avoid falling into the destructive “fourth box,” 
or Hawk/Hawk combination, which is costly for everyone. To the 
extent that law can foster the emergence of a stable nonconflictual 
equilibrium, it helps increase net social welfare. 
McAdams’s theory of expressive law depends on the law’s ability 
to foster expectations in players’ minds about how others will 
move. Because each player stands to gain if he coordinates his ac-
tions with others, the ability to predict how opponents will behave 
confers an advantage. According to McAdams, the law imparts 
useful information through its capacity to call attention to specific 
options for playing the game. As an empirical matter, highlighting 
 
5 See Rasmusen, supra note 4, at 73 (explaining that the simple chicken game has no 
unique Nash solution; rather it has a mixed strategy equilibrium and “two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria”). This statement is an oversimplification. Strictly speaking, 
there may be one Nash solution in a few cases where payoffs differ for row and 
column players, because there may be some games in which there is a strictly 
dominant (although different) strategy for each player. Nonetheless, the existence of 
more than one equilibrium strategy will generally be assumed for games under 
consideration in this Comment, including the games with different row and column 
payoffs discussed herein. 
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an option creates the expectation that everyone will follow that op-
tion. Because each player strives to coordinate with others, each 
willingly takes a cue from the expectations the law creates. Thus 
does law as expression harness individual self-interest to influence 
action in desirable directions without imposing sanctions on any-
one. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to question the basic ele-
ments of McAdams’s account of how law affects expectations and 
players’ choice of strategy. Rather, its goal is to apply and extend 
his insights to a variation on the basic game theoretic model that is 
the focus of his analysis. The examples McAdams uses to develop 
his theory represent the simplest types of Hawk-Dove situations. 
These games share two key features that are crucial to the discussion 
in this Comment. First, as exemplified by Figure 4 in McAdams’s 
Article,6 they display a characteristic pattern of payoffs in which 
each player receives the same amount for a particular response to 
an opponent’s move regardless of whether that player occupies the 
row (designated by McAdams as R) or column (designated by 
McAdams as C) position in the game. For purposes of this Com-
ment, arrays fitting this pattern are designated “balanced arrays.” 
Games that deviate from this pattern by assigning different payoffs 
to R and C players for the same strategic combinations —as in the 
examples provided in the Appendix to this Comment—will be des-
ignated “unbalanced” games. 
The second feature shared by most games in McAdams’s Article 
is a high degree of mobility or interchangeability between roles in 
the game. In reiterated games with repetitive rounds of play, a 
player occupying the row position on one round is eligible to oc-
cupy the column position on another. Games in which players can 
easily swap roles will be designated “fluid” or “nonrigid” and those 
in which they cannot will be designated “fixed” or “rigid.” 
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the implications of 
McAdams’s theory of expressive law for Hawk-Dove games in 
which payoffs are unbalanced and role assignments fairly fixed. 
These games are of special interest because many social interac-
tions can be modeled along these lines and those interactions are 
often at issue in troubling conflicts that attend various forms of so-
 
6 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1675. 
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cial inequality. In particular, the conventions observed in these cir-
cumstances tend to be “oppressive” in giving rise to durable 
inequalities among identifiable social groups. Taking for granted 
the basic features of McAdams’s analysis, this Comment will exam-
ine whether and how law in its expressive capacity might operate to 
influence the “oppressive” conventions that tend to emerge in so-
cial situations that mimic unbalanced games with rigid roles and 
how the law might alter those conventions once established. 
The potential to generate oppressive conventions is not unique 
to games with differential payoffs, however: Oppressive norms can 
emerge in balanced as well as unbalanced games. Within the two 
pure-strategy equilibrium options (Hawk/Dove or Dove/Hawk), 
players assigned the aggressive role (Hawk) will do better than 
those assigned the passive role (Dove) even when primary payoffs 
are the same for everyone.7 This shows that the “oppressiveness” of 
norms is primarily a function of the fixity or fluidity of roles rather 
than of the values in the payoff array. The emergence of stable 
conventions will consign those stuck playing the nonaggressive po-
sition to permanent disadvantage unless they are able to “change 
places” with opponents with ease. The inequalities of payoffs that 
characterize “pure-strategy” equilibria in Hawk-Dove games thus 
threaten to create a permanent “overclass” and “underclass” of in-
dividuals—and to become potentially problematic—only when 
there is little mobility among players occupying the different posi-
tions in the game. 
This Comment argues that there are features of “oppressive” 
conventions that tend to emerge in games with lopsided payoffs 
that render them of special interest and concern. Those features 
are also the very ones that pose special challenges to McAdams’s 
theory of expressive law because they predict resistance to influ-
ence or centralized orchestration through the powers McAdams 
assigns to legal expression. First, as explained more fully below, 
many of the games that fit this pattern and are of the greatest social 
interest revolve around “naturally” salient characteristics of per-
sons, such as race, sex, or ethnicity. Play will tend spontaneously to 
coordinate around these features, obviating any role for a legally 
suggested or mandated focal point. Second, the conventions that 
 
7 See id. at 1674–75. 
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dominate these types of games may be particularly resistant to offi-
cial influence at the formation stage because they are driven by 
individual responses to payoff values. Third, oppressive norms in 
unbalanced games would appear to be particularly impervious to 
alteration by legal expression, because the risks from attempting to 
modify the dominant conventions are greatest for players who 
stand to benefit most, and law, apart from its ability to sanction, 
would not appear to alter those risks. 
Yet such norms do change. Although McAdams’s discussion is 
concerned both with the role of expressive law in fostering the 
emergence of “pure” strategy conventions and in how law can 
change conventions once they emerge, the discussion here will cen-
ter on how law in this capacity might operate to fuel shifts in 
“oppressive” conventions that tend to emerge in unbalanced 
games. The reasons for concentrating on norm change in this con-
text are twofold. First, because the informal forces driving the 
games at issue towards particular equilibria are strong, the problem 
in many Hawk-Dove-like social circumstances is not the absence of 
coordinated play or imperfect coordination but a high degree of 
coordinated play in socially problematic directions. Second, per-
manent and sweeping social inequalities, productive of widespread 
disaffection and social unrest, may result from the entrenchment of 
“oppressive” norms. These consequences will tend to spur agita-
tion to overturn existing conventions or mitigate their outcomes. 
An understanding of a potential role for expressive law in fostering 
change is vital to the project of altering these norms. 
In explaining how norm changes might occur in these contexts, 
this Comment rejects McAdams’s account of norm change without 
denying the possibility that law plays an expressive role. Instead it 
offers a different theory of how legal expression might contribute 
to the defeat of “oppressive” norms. Specifically, the account of-
fered here minimizes the importance of “cranks” (individuals who 
suffer minimally from conflict), to whom McAdams assigns a piv-
otal role in norm change. It relies instead on morally outraged 
underdogs (or those assigned the nonaggressive role under the 
status quo). It predicts that underdogs’ self-sacrificial moves, as 
spurred by moral sentiments and encouraged by law, will fuel stra-
tegic shifts towards conventions that favor those disadvantaged by 
previously entrenched norms. 
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II. VARIATIONS ON A THEME:  
UNBALANCED PAYOFFS AND FIXED ROLES 
A. Unbalanced Payoffs 
It is best to begin by considering in more detail the peculiar fea-
tures of the games that dominate McAdams’s Article. As 
suggested, the payoff array in Figure 4 is typical. The first feature 
of importance is that the expected payoff from playing Hawk or 
Dove, holding the other player’s move constant, is the same for 
each player regardless of whether that player occupies the row (R) 
or column (C) position. If any player plays Dove to another’s 
Dove, he gains a payoff of 1. If he plays Dove to the other’s Hawk, 
he gains nothing. Playing Hawk to another Hawk always produces 
a loss of 2, and Hawk to Dove always earns 2 regardless of who 
plays that role. Thus, the gains from adopting an aggressive or 
submissive posture—from being assertive or deferential—are the 
same for everyone, and do not depend on identity, social role, or 
assigned position within the game. This condition produces the 
classic balanced array for the Hawk-Dove game. That array is 
symmetrical within the matched strategy boxes (the gains to play-
ing Hawk match those to Hawk for the Hawk/Hawk combination 
and the gains to Dove are the same for both players in 
Dove/Dove). It is also symmetrical across the diagonal for mis-
matched strategies (the Hawk/Dove payoffs are the flip side of the 
Dove/Hawk payoffs). Because McAdams uses the terms “symmet-
rical” and “asymmetrical” to refer to pure-strategy conventions 
that emerge with “labeled” or focal-point play, rather than to the 
pattern of primary payoffs within the game, this Comment will re-
frain from using that terminology to describe payoff patterns. 
Rather, it will stick to the term “balanced” or “unbalanced” to de-
scribe arrays similar, respectively, to that in Figure 4 of McAdams’s 
Article, or to arrays similar to those in the games set forth in the 
Appendix to this Comment. 
In contrast, an unbalanced Hawk-Dove game is one in which 
row and column players can expect to fare very differently from 
opponents depending on whether they adopt an aggressive or 
nonaggressive posture. The following (see Game #1 in Appendix, 
p. 1777) provides an example of such an array: 
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B 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    8, 5  5, 15 
 
 
R Hawk -12, 2 -10,-2 
 
There are many possible variations on this basic theme with 
complex implications for strategies of play. For example, unbal-
anced games can arguably be divided into two types. There are 
those games in which the actions that constitute the aggressive and 
passive choices are precisely the same for both players (for exam-
ple, fighting for a piece of property versus backing off), but payoffs 
differ for different players due to individual attributes or circum-
stances. The Division of Labor game (see Appendix, p. 1778) is 
one such game. In other games, the game is formally structured so 
that each party’s options can be viewed as either Hawklike or 
Dovelike (that is, assertive or acquiescent), but the parties do not 
actually make identical moves within the game. The sexual har-
assment game is one such example. Since the strategy options 
within the game for men and women are not precisely the same,8 
there is no reason to think the payoffs would be either. Despite the 
differences among these games, the Hawk-Dove model can serve 
for interactions with differential payoffs in which the Hawklike or 
Dovelike actions for players are either the same or not. 
What these games have in common with each other and with the 
classic balanced Hawk-Dove games is the parties’ order of prefer-
ence. Each player prefers the dominant position (playing Hawk to 
the other’s Dove) to the submissive one. Cooperation (Dove/Dove) 
is second best and conflict is the least desirable for each. The games 
set forth here generally differ from the classic balanced array in 
that the column player (C) has more to gain overall from being as-
sertive and playing Hawk than does his opponent, regardless of 
what the other party does. Likewise, player R’s expected gains 
from playing Dove are greater than C’s. In addition, although both 
parties have a paramount interest in avoiding conflict, C has less to 
 
8 We can say that the man is playing the “Hawk” strategy by engaging in 
harassment. But the Hawkish woman doesn’t harass back—she does something 
different, like trying to get her harasser fired. So even though both moves are “Hawk-
like”—in that they deliver the largest possible payoff to each player when the other 
player backs down—they are clearly very different actions. 
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lose than his opponent from the conflictual situation 
(Hawk/Hawk). Variations on this pattern are possible within the 
context of a range of payoffs for row and column players. For ex-
ample, C might have more to gain from playing Hawk to Dove 
than R, but more to lose (or less to gain) from conflict. These varia-
tions may give rise to different predictions about which equilibria 
will emerge spontaneously or in response to outside cues. For pur-
poses of this Comment, discussion will be confined to the general 
pattern exemplified by the subset of games set forth in the Appen-
dix, which are arguably typical of at least some real-life situations.9 
B. Fixed Roles 
The other pertinent feature of the games that dominate 
McAdams’s discussion is that players’ roles are more or less inter-
changeable. Each player is free on successive rounds to take turns 
occupying the row or column position at will. Alternatively, cir-
cumstances guarantee that a player will find himself in each 
position on a fairly random basis. As already noted, interchange-
 
9 How might games with unbalanced payoffs emerge in social situations? What are 
the real-life psychological analogs of the costs and benefits represented by these 
characteristic arrays? The payoffs in the sample game above, for example, would 
result if Ms. R had a greater taste for cooperation than Mr. C so that, regardless of her 
opponent’s move, playing Dove would always be less painful or more pleasant for her 
than for him. Alternatively, R may assign independent importance to harmonious and 
cooperative relations wholly apart from any tangible benefits it might bring, whereas 
C might care less about social harmony or vaguely disdain it. For this reason, R might 
gain more psychic utility from playing Dove to an opponents’ Dove. Along the same 
lines, C might relish dominance or dislike playing the submissive role, thus gaining 
extra psychic utility from playing Hawk to Dove and less benefit from adopting the 
deferential posture. R might have the opposite preferences: Although she would 
enjoy the tangible benefits of playing the dominant role, those gains must be 
discounted by her greater discomfort with the Hawk role and lesser distaste for 
submission. R might also harbor a more intense aversion to conflict as such relative to 
C, so that she suffers greater costs from finding herself caught in a Hawk/Hawk 
situation and is more eager to avoid it. Alternatively, R may have more to lose from 
conflict than her opponent because he is stronger, bigger, or more wealthy and can 
“hurt her more” if they come to blows. R may have fewer and less desirable 
alternatives than C outside the interactive context, which would be reflected in the 
overall pattern of payoffs in the array. 
As this discussion suggests, these types of intraplayer differences may characterize 
the interactions of women and men at home and at work. Social relations among 
members of different cultural, ethnic, or religious groups could also be modeled this 
way. For discussion in the context of gender, see, for example, Nancy Folbre & 
Thomas E. Weisskopf, Did Father Know Best? Families, Markets and the Supply of 
Caring Labor, in Economics, Values and Organizations 171, 188 (Avner Ben-Ner & 
Louis Putterman eds., 1998); Rose, supra note 4; Wax, supra note 4. 
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ability matters whether arrays are balanced or unbalanced. If the 
focal feature that correlates with the assertive or yielding role 
within an established pure-strategy convention is one that picks out 
a fixed subgroup, one category of players can enjoy enduring gains 
at the expense of the other. That can happen when the chosen fea-
ture is immutable or when it is linked to circumstances or traits 
that are difficult or costly to modify. The convention that blue-eyed 
drivers yield to brown-eyed drivers may create a world in which the 
blue-eyed are chronically late and the brown-eyed always on time. 
That inequality does not depend on different payoffs assigned to 
different players in the array, but only on the emergence of an 
equilibrium that ties moves in the game to an inborn trait. 
McAdams’s discussion is primarily concerned with games where 
the prospect of winning or losing under the dominant convention is 
not fixed forever. In the first possession or “property” game as de-
scribed by McAdams,10 it is open to most individuals within society 
to acquire property and defend it, taking a turn at playing Hawk to 
someone else’s Dove. Yet property owners will also find them-
selves respecting others’ property rights, thereby playing Doves to 
others’ Hawks. In the crossroads game, the traveler approaching 
the intersection from the “wrong” direction (left or right, or green 
pole side or opposite) must defer to someone approaching at right 
angles and bear with the inconvenience and aggravation of delay. 
But chances are that the next time that same traveler will approach 
from the opposite direction and will be allowed to go first. The 
smoker/nonsmoker game is less clear-cut, but experience suggests 
that the roles there are fairly mutable as well. A smoker today has 
the chance to become a nonsmoker tomorrow and vice versa. Al-
though smokers may find it hard to quit and some nonsmokers may 
never be tempted, it is not uncommon for people to resume smok-
ing or quit smoking more than once in a lifetime. 
Fluidity of roles is not the exclusive preserve of balanced games. 
Indeed, balanced payoffs are the exception rather than the rule for 
joint action in real life. Most interactions—whether between fixed 
or fluid categories of individuals—do not generate identical gains 
for all participants. Employers and employees, fellow employees, 
 
10 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1693–95; see also Sugden, supra note 4, at 70–71 
(describing how the Hawk-Dove game is likely to lead to some convention of 
property). 
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buyers and sellers, business partners, roommates, marital partners, 
sharers of public goods, and users of public accommodations all 
cooperate in ventures where unequal payoffs are the rule rather 
than the exception. The fate of participants is not absolutely fixed, 
however, because there is usually some potential for moving from 
one role into another. As noted, most people have the wherewithal 
to own property. An employee who works for others may realize 
his dream of starting his own business and getting others to work 
for him. Many enterprises function simultaneously as buyers and 
sellers, and people who are galled by the rules for buyers can move 
into sales. In numerous contexts, parties unhappy with conventions 
that disfavor their kind can take steps to transform themselves into 
the opposition. 
Nonetheless, swapping roles within games of conflict and coop-
eration is rarely without costs. Those costs are not uniform across 
contexts and can vary considerably among individual social actors. 
Fluidity and interchangeability lie on a continuum, and the burdens 
of switching positions are often not the same in both directions for 
any game. It is harder to become a nonsmoker than a smoker, eas-
ier to lose one’s property than to obtain and keep it. At one end of 
the continuum lie true “equal opportunity” games—those in which 
players enjoy virtually unimpeded access to alternative roles and 
freely assume them. At the other end are those that assign roles 
based either on immutable traits or on roles so costly to change—
because of large sunk costs or the need for fresh heavy invest-
ments—that they are effectively immutable in practice. 
III. UNBALANCED PAYOFFS AND FIXED ROLES:  
THE WORKINGS OF EXPRESSIVE LAW 
Although the potential for oppressiveness is at least theoretically 
present in both balanced and unbalanced games, the remainder of 
this Comment will be concerned primarily with games character-
ized by both an imbalance in payoffs and fixity of roles. The 
discussion will investigate the potential role of legal expression in 
the formation and alteration of conventions that arise in these 
games. The quest to understand the place of law as expression in 
this context is of theoretical as well as practical concern. The ex-
amples set forth in the Appendix attempt to model well-known 
interactions between persons of different races and sexes. These 
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games tend to gravitate towards conventions that have important 
distributional and social consequences for the fate of these social 
groups. The dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game predict that mem-
bers of one group will repeatedly tend to play Hawk to the other 
group’s Dove, thereby garnering the lion’s share of the gains from 
cooperation. Members of the group who play Doves to the others’ 
Hawks will find themselves at a permanent disadvantage. Because 
there is little potential for “trading places,” the consequences of 
playing the game will not even out. These are the settings in which 
the emergence of “oppressive” norms appears most troublesome 
and perplexing and poses the greatest challenge to law’s capacity to 
change private patterns of behavior. 
How might the law influence the conventions that emerge for 
the conduct of games typified by the Appendix examples? How 
might the law change those conventions once they become en-
trenched? This discussion suggests that there are two key elements 
of these games that have important implications for the process of 
norm formation and for law’s influence on that process. The first is 
the “natural” salience of the particular focal features around which 
strategies in these games tend to coordinate in practice; the second 
is the manner in which the values in the unbalanced payoff arrays 
tend to influence the conventions that emerge. These issues will be 
examined in the remainder of Part III. The fundamental structure 
of these games also affects the options for changing those norms that 
have already become established. In Parts IV and V of this Com-
ment, I will set forth a theory of norm change and of expressive 
law’s place within it that represents an alternative to McAdams’s 
thesis. The proposed account fits better with observed social pat-
terns and is tailored more precisely to the specific dynamics of the 
games under consideration here. 
A. “Natural” Salience and Labeling Features for Coordination 
McAdams identifies one initial function for law in norm forma-
tion as the selection and advertisement of an “asymmetry” or focal 
point around which pure-strategy equilibria can converge.11 The 
options are to create an artificial feature, such as green poles on 
unmarked pavement, or to draw attention to some existing element 
 
11 McAdams, supra note 3, at Section I.C.1. 
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of the world or of social life. The characteristic chosen may have 
some degree of “natural” salience—it may be something that peo-
ple tend to notice spontaneously, Or it may be some arbitrary 
element of the environment that is not particularly interesting in 
itself but that comes to command attention just because the law 
picks it out for special notice. McAdams wonders more than once 
why and how the observable features (or “natural asymmetries”) 
around which pure-strategy conventions actually coordinate are se-
lected from the myriad ones available around us.12 Clearly, many 
such features come into use without official intervention, and the 
corresponding conventions appear to arise spontaneously without 
significant prodding from centralized authorities.13 Alternatively, 
legal rules may “piggyback” on preexisting tendencies, and amplify 
spontaneous processes, by picking out naturally salient features as 
focal points for coordination. Although McAdams acknowledges 
that many conventions arise informally though extralegal mecha-
nisms, he nevertheless suggests that there remains a significant role 
for law in fostering coordination and encouraging the emergence of 
pure equilibria in many cases. Critical to that possibility is the law’s 
deliberate selection and advertisement of focal features or asym-
metries around which pure strategies can coalesce. 
The emergence of oppressive pure-strategy norms in the games 
of interest here depends critically on players’ tending to notice cer-
tain elements like race and sex and to make them the basis for 
coordinated strategies of play. The ubiquity of race- and sex-based 
conventions in the conduct of social life worldwide and throughout 
history suggests that these features are “naturally” salient. As 
clear, public, universal, and easily discernible parameters, sex and 
race may have special psychological appeal or may be especially 
well suited for coordinating social action. In addition, the practical 
need to identify, respond to, cooperate with, or defend against in-
dividuals from disparate groups or the opposite sex provides a 
compelling basis for a “natural” interest in racial and sexual char-
acteristics. For all these reasons, racial and sexual differences are 
likely to emerge spontaneously as focal points in the types of coor-
 
12 See id. at 1693–96. 
13 See Posner, supra note 4, at 30 (discussing the idea that common law follows on, 
rather than creates, conventions of property and social interaction that evolved 
informally). 
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dination and conflict games that can be played more efficiently in 
pure-strategy equilibria. 
McAdams’s analytic framework helps make sense of the perva-
siveness of sex- and race-based conventions and roles. If sex and 
race are naturally more salient and more interesting than green 
poles and many other characteristics, pure-strategy equilibria tied 
to those attributes can be expected to emerge extralegally, sponta-
neously, and informally on a fairly regular basis. But to the extent 
that “labeling” is the vital first step—and may be the only impor-
tant step—in initiating the dynamic that leads to pure coordinated 
play, the self-executing choice of race or sex as a focal point of co-
ordination suggests a minimal role for law in norm formation. 
Since, by hypothesis, labeling is most of what the law does,14 this 
leaves the law with little work to do in fostering coordinated 
strategies for familiar interactions involving men and women or 
members of different groups. That sex- and group-identity-based 
conventions tend to emerge repeatedly in different cultures world-
wide suggests that official attempts to select and advertise focal 
points have not played a major role in the emergence of many im-
portant practices that dominate informal social interactions. 
Official nudging in these contexts may be both unnecessary and ir-
relevant.15 
B. Convention Formation 
Although McAdams suggests that “labeling” or picking out a fo-
cal feature for coordination is the critical beneficial function for 
expressive law in fostering salutary social cooperation,16 that is not 
all the law does in many cases. Selecting a feature for coordinated 
play does not in itself determine which of two pure-strategy equi-
librium options will emerge as the dominant convention. The 
choice potentially depends on a number of factors that operate in 
different contexts. Chance, random variation, “bounded rational-
ity,” mistakes, or experimentation17 may push play towards one 
 
14 But see infra Section III.B. 
15 McAdams’s analysis (and this Comment’s gloss on it) suggests why the belief that 
law has been central to “constructing” sex- or race-based social rules—if not in 
helping to sustain them—may be unwarranted. 
16 McAdams, supra note 3, 1691–95. 
17 See sources cited infra note 26. 
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pure strategy or the other. Or a preexisting expectation—perhaps 
from some intrinsic psychological tendency—may link one value of 
the coordinating feature to an aggressive or submissive role. For ex-
ample, where the location of property operates as a salient feature in 
the “possession” game, all players might share the expectation that 
the player closest to the property will aggressively claim it. Or peo-
ple of both sexes may expect that the person physically closest to 
the baby will care for it. Although the reasons are not always well 
understood, the direction of players’ responses to a salient feature 
will not always be random. 
Alternatively, the law can try to choose the prevailing conven-
tion by announcing a particular strategy for play, such as when it 
declares that those on the side of the green poles must yield. The 
argument here, however, is that the law will have less leeway to 
choose one rule rather than another where payoffs are not the 
same for all players. Players in unbalanced games will tend to move 
inexorably and spontaneously toward one pure-strategy equilib-
rium rather than the other because the structure of the payoffs is 
biased toward the emergence of one conventional mode of play. 
1. Emergence of Conventions in Balanced Games 
Legal authorities in charge of traffic can set up green poles by 
roadsides and call attention to them. Although coordination may re-
sult with time, the actual rule that will emerge cannot be predicted. 
It is as likely that one green-pole rule (pole-side yield) will emerge 
as it is that its opposite (pole-side right-of-way) will. Alternatively, 
the law can go further and declare that vehicles approaching an in-
tersection on the green pole side shall have the right of way. 
McAdams suggests that, even absent direct enforcement, the mere 
declaration makes it more likely that the announced rule will pre-
vail.18 
In most games with a balanced payoff structure, the central au-
thority will have no reason to favor one rule over another: It 
matters only that there be a rule. The principal purpose is to elimi-
nate costly conflicts, and this can be accomplished regardless of 
which convention wins out. One convention will not ordinarily be 
more socially efficient or beneficial overall, since either produces 
 
18 See McAdams, supra note 3, at 1681–83. 
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the same sum total of payoffs to the players. Although one conven-
tion might result in the “oppression” of one group by another (as 
when coordination is tied to some fixed identity trait), switching 
conventions is, in this context, a zero-sum game.19 Alternatively, 
the existence of negative externalities or undesirable third-party ef-
fects may provide a reason to favor one pure-strategy convention 
over its opposite.20 Absent such conditions, however, the equality 
of total payoffs from the game regardless of which convention is 
chosen will make the choice between them a matter of indiffer-
ence, if not to the players themselves, then to the social unit 
overall. 
As for the players in balanced games, they definitely will favor 
the convention that favors them. But absent some preexisting bias, 
psychological or otherwise, shared by all,21 individual players can-
not do much, consistent with rational self-interest, to push 
conventions in a personally beneficial direction. As McAdams’s 
analysis makes clear, the payoff structure of balanced games means 
that the convention that emerges from “labeled” play in the Hawk-
Dove context depends largely on chance perturbations and arbi-
trary deviations from randomness. Self-seeking responses to those 
variations or mistakes cause conventions to evolve over time in one 
direction or another.22 But the similarity of payoffs to all players 
means that the direction of evolution cannot be predicted ahead of 
time. There is no bias inherent in the structure of the game that fa-
vors evolving towards one convention over the other. 
Sex roles are an interesting case in point. Even if payoffs were 
similar for men and women in their cooperative interactions—and 
 
19 See discussion infra pp. 1750–51 on “table-turning” and changing oppressive 
norms. 
20 An example is the smoker/nonsmoker game. Although there may be no reasons 
intrinsic to the game to choose the nonsmoker-dominant over the smoker-dominant 
norm, there may be external reasons to do so: the costs to third parties, not reflected 
in direct losses to smokers, of increased death and morbidity from smoking. See 
discussion infra Section IV.B. Other balanced games giving rise to norms that track 
immutable traits, by creating entrenched advantages and disadvantages, might also 
generate undesirable extrinsic social consequences. But it is hard to see why anyone 
outside the game would care whether those driving on the green-pole side have the 
right of way or not. 
21 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
22 See, e.g., Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 4 (describing evolution by mutation); 
Picker, supra note 4 (describing how movements by different agents change eventual 
outcomes). 
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were indeed the same for all potential players regardless of sex—
conventions might still emerge in which dominant and submissive 
roles correlated with sex. The natural salience of sex means that 
the assignment of social roles by sex—as in the “division of labor 
game” in the Appendix—could still occur even in the absence of 
any sex difference in preferences or payoffs. But if the array in 
sexual “division of labor” games in different cultures were indeed 
balanced in every case, that should give rise to very different social 
and historical patterns than those observed. Because there would 
then be nothing in the game that favored one equilibrium conven-
tion over its opposite, men should end up playing the dominant 
role under the conventions that emerge in some times and places 
and women should dominate in others.23 One would not expect to 
see similar tasks assigned to each sex in most societies in which the 
game was played. 
2. Emergence of Conventions in Unbalanced Games 
This is not the pattern of sex role differentiation that is actually 
observed. Historical and cultural reality are more consistent with 
unbalanced payoffs in the division of labor game. Although “label-
ing” creates the potential to move toward one of two pure-strategy 
equilibrium conventions in games with unbalanced arrays, these 
conventions are not equally likely to evolve under the pressure of 
the players’ spontaneous choices. Unlike with the balanced array, 
the expected payoff from any move (Hawk or Dove) is not the 
same for each player.24 In Game #1 (Appendix, p. 1777) for exam-
ple, player R has less reason to take assertive action than C. 
Assuming an initially equal chance that an opponent will fight or 
back down, R gains less than C from dominating his opponent and 
suffers a greater loss from conflict. Not only does R have less to 
gain from being assertive than his opponent, but assertiveness 
(playing Hawk) has a lower expected value for him than submis-
 
23 Once again, this analysis makes the simplifying assumption that there are no other 
preexisting factors that tend to tilt the convention in one direction or that establish a 
shared psychological link between certain players and particular roles or tasks. See, 
e.g., McAdams, supra note 3, at 1663 (speculating that rationality cannot “fully 
explain why some solutions ‘stick out’ from others”). 
24 C has an expected value from Hawk of 0.5 * (15 – 2) = 6.5. R has an expected 
value from Hawk of 0.5 * (12 – 10) = 1. C has an expected value from Dove of 0.5 * ( 5 
+ 2) = 3.5. R has an expected value from Dove of 0.5 * (8 + 5) = 6.5. 
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sion (playing Dove). Since R gains less from dominance, he will 
tend to “try out” the nonaggressive posture (Dove) more often on 
multiple rounds of play. Likewise, because C expects to gain more 
from dominance than from playing Dove, he will opt for an aggres-
sive posture more often. This reflects the high gains to C from 
dominating R as well as the smaller downside risk to C from con-
flict. Thus even knowing nothing of their opponents’ payoffs, 
expectations, and preferences, R and C will make a very different 
mix of moves in their initial forays into the game.25 C will tend to 
favor the Hawk posture, and R will tend to choose Dove. But the 
more often C plays Hawk, the more often it behooves R to respond 
by playing Dove (to avoid conflict), and vice versa. Since Hawk is 
C’s best response to R’s Dove, C will play Hawk with increasing 
frequency. Play will move swiftly towards the equilibrium in which 
R plays the “underdog” and C the “top dog.” In sum, the individ-
ual choices players can be expected to make at the outset will tend 
to favor the emergence of only one of the two available Nash 
equilibria as the dominant convention for play. That bias results 
from players’ responses to their own expected payoffs, which are 
implicit in the structure of the game. Moreover, if players’ roles 
have payoff-driven tendencies, then conventions in which they go 
with those tendencies (“natural” conventions) will tend to be 
difficult to unseat (via “mutation”) relative to conventions in which 
players contravene their tendencies.26 This means that most of the 
time the natural convention will be in effect. 
 
25 Players’ knowing something of their opponents’ payoffs will exacerbate the 
tendency to make disparate moves at the outset and help speed progress towards the 
C-dominant/R-submissive equilibrium. Thus, if R knows that C has a lot to gain by 
playing Hawk, R will, at the margin, believe that C is more likely to play Hawk. It will 
then pay for R to play Dove most of the time, which will establish the reigning 
equilibrium even more quickly than if R had no preexisting knowledge of C’s payoffs 
but knew only his own. 
26 Another way to see this point is through the concept of the “tippability” of 
equilibrium conventions, as explored most recently by Paul Mahoney and Chris 
Sanchirico. See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 4, at 21–24. For more on this, see 
Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation, 91 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 290 (1997); Dean Foster & Peyton Young, Stochastic Evolutionary 
Game Dynamics, 38 Theoretical Population Biology 219 (1990); Michihiro Kandori et 
al., Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games, 61 Econometrica 29 
(1993); H. Peyton Young, The Evolution of Conventions, 61 Econometrica 57 (1993). 
Assuming that players sometimes deviate randomly by “mutation” or otherwise from 
the moves dictated by the entrenched equilibrium convention, the question is how 
many mutations or deviations are required to make it in everyone’s self-interest to 
move to the alternative stable convention. In our case, for example, assume that the 
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What are the implications of these observations for the role of 
expressive law in regulating conventions in unbalanced games? 
McAdams devotes a good deal of attention to law’s power to spur 
the emergence of efficient pure-strategy conventions out of the less 
efficient chaos of mixed strategy or nonconventional play. Law can 
do good at low cost by creating focality. In addition, it can speed 
progress toward coordinated play by selecting a particular conven-
tion or suggesting a particular rule. These are elegant and important 
insights. But the account of the evolution of conventions in unbal-
anced games set out here points up the limitations inherent in this 
picture of law’s expressive role. In this setting the choice of con-
vention is not up for grabs. Rather, players spontaneously make 
moves that drive the game forcefully towards one convention 
rather than the other. If the structure of payoffs means that R gen-
erally chooses to play Dove more often than C plays Hawk, it is in 
both players’ interest to continue on the path towards the pure 
equilibrium in which C is the aggressor and R submits. Not only 
does that progression need little prodding from law, but it is hard 
to imagine how law in its expressive capacity (that is, apart from al-
tering the payoffs in the array itself) could operate to influence 
play away from the predicted direction. Unlike the balanced case, 
where disarray can persist for a long time because “nothing favors 
a particular pure Nash equilibrium,”27 disarray is unlikely to persist 
for very long where payoffs diverge. The interests of the players 
take over to drive away disarray and enshrine the expected con-
ventions. This account suggests that, as a practical matter, there is 
very little room for law as expression to operate in shaping the ini-
                                                                                                                                       
existing convention is the opposite of what we predict would emerge: that is, assume 
that all column (C) players play Dove and all row (R) players play Hawk. Tipping this 
“unnatural” convention would require relatively few mutations. That is because it 
would not take many encounters with a “mutant” R player (playing “natural” Dove 
instead of his “unnatural” Hawk role) to make it in the interest of C players to 
convert to Hawk, and vice versa. Players do so much better with the C-Hawk/R-Dove 
convention than with the opposite that it does not take many forays into the former 
combination for it to emerge decisively as the favored one. 
In contrast, the “natural” convention of C-Hawk/R-Dove is difficult to unseat 
through the process of mutation. Intrinsic payoffs generally make R players reluctant 
to play Hawk and C players reluctant to play Dove. Starting from the “natural” 
convention, therefore, there would have to be a lot of “mutant” R players switching to 
Hawk before C players were convinced to go to Dove, relative to how many “mutant” 
R players (those playing Dove) it would take, starting from the “unnatural” 
convention of R-Hawk/C-Dove, to switch the C players towards their “natural” 
position of Hawk. 
27 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1673. 
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tial formation or selection of norms in games with unbalanced ar-
rays—especially where these are based on “naturally salient” 
features. Our intuition is that oppressive norms can develop apace 
without centralized direction and that expressive efforts will have 
little or no effect on the adoption of these “natural” conventions. 
IV. CHANGING NORMS 
A. Alternative Stable Equilibria: Whose Ox Is Gored? 
The analysis so far suggests that expressive law may have little to 
do with norms that emerge in unbalanced games where players fall 
into “naturally” salient categories and players indulge their “natu-
ral” tendencies for play. We would not expect law to have much 
influence on the focal feature around which the convention will 
tend to coordinate, nor would we expect much influence on the ac-
tual convention selected, which is a function primarily of player 
responses to expected payoffs. 
This brings us to the issue of norm change. The challenge pre-
sented by the worst of oppressive norms is not one of 
incoordination and chaos but, if anything, too much uniformity and 
conformity in the “wrong” direction. So even if law as expression 
would appear to be unimportant to the emergence of oppressive 
conventions, there still remains the question of whether expressive 
law can be enlisted to help change existing norms. As already 
noted, this question matters a great deal: Better to use “cheap talk” 
than expensive (and imperfectly effective) penalties to effect 
changes in behavior. 
The issue of how we might unseat oppressive norms, however, 
prompts us to take a fresh look at the question of why we might 
want to change them. In light of the analysis so far, this question is 
a potentially troublesome one. As we have seen, once a feature is 
chosen around which play can coordinate, there are only two 
“pure” strategy equilibria to choose from. In unbalanced games 
like those in the Appendix, the prediction is that a C-dominant/R-
submissive convention will emerge “naturally.” But what would it 
mean to “change” that convention? The only change that would es-
tablish a self-sustaining and stable convention—and also avoid the 
costly and undesirable “fourth box” of conflict—would be one that 
“turned the tables” on the players by flipping the pure-strategy re-
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sult from the reigning C-Hawk/R-Dove to R-Hawk/C-Dove. An-
other alternative would be to try to move the game into the box of 
mutual cooperation, or the Dove/Dove combination. That strategy 
is inherently unstable, however: The parties have no incentive to 
adhere to it and continuous intervention to alter payoffs would be 
required to preserve the status quo. Although a spontaneous 
change in players’ tastes could effect that result,28 that state of af-
fairs would not appear to be one that law could bring about, at 
least in the short term, without employing its sanctioning power. 
This suggests that the changes in so-called oppressive conven-
tions that the law could effect expressively will end up being a 
matter of table-turning or reassigning the roles of winners and los-
ers rather than of mitigating the inequalities inherent in those 
roles. This highlights a hard truth about the social interactions 
modeled as Hawk-Dove games, including many coordinated 
around elements of players’ “identity”: Their very structure dic-
tates that the interests of one class of players must be elevated over 
another as the price of fruitful cooperation and of minimizing 
costly social conflict.29 Nothing short of revising payoffs would ap-
pear to abolish this constraint.30 The point is that it is difficult to see 
how mere expressive intervention without continuous sanctions 
could produce and maintain any nonequilibrium outcome, at least 
over the long term. The model of expressive law that McAdams 
and others suggest is a clockwork conception that is largely self-
executing: Law pushes the game in one direction but the parties’ 
self-interest drives the mechanism. 
 
28 See discussion infra pp. 1754–55, 1760–63 of shifts in players’ tastes and 
preferences as one mechanism of norm change. 
29 For a discussion about sexual harassment along these lines see, for example, 
Kingsley Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment: Seeking 
Roots in Biology Rather than Ideology, 8 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 5, 37–39 & n.183 
(Spring 1997) (asking “who is to blame” for psychological gender differences that lead 
to different perceptions of the meaning of workplace conduct, and suggesting there is 
no apparent reason why the law favors women’s viewpoints or interests over men’s); 
see also Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal 
Level of Loss, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 427 (1994) (adopting a “neutral” or nonjudgmental 
stance towards the tradeoffs of men’s and women’s interests inherent in different 
sexual harassment rules or norms). 
30 See, e.g., Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 4 (using civil liability to alter payoff 
arrays and influence moves in the game by mandating transfers of resources between 
the parties). 
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Before proceeding to investigate how legal expression might 
change oppressive norms, we must inquire why we might want to 
effect a change that favors previous losers over current winners. 
One justification looks not to distributional effects but to effi-
ciency. Some norms may be socially wasteful. If the sum total of 
payoffs to all players in the game is less than under some alterna-
tive stable convention, that alone may justify intervention to shift 
the norm. In contrast to games with similar payoffs for opponents,31 
different strategies for playing unbalanced games may generate 
quite different gains overall. As can be seen from the examples 
provided in the Appendix, the possible stable equilibria, including 
the convention that will emerge “naturally,” will not always repre-
sent the most efficient combination of moves for the sum total of 
social welfare. In some cases, the disfavored equilibrium maximizes 
total utility. In others, the nonequilibrium cooperative combination 
(Dove/Dove) is most efficient. 
As suggested earlier,32 undesirable externalities or third-party ef-
fects provide another reason to try to “flip” the dominant 
convention. The smoker/nonsmoker game, which McAdams dis-
cusses at length, is one example. The costs and benefits to 
“players” reflected in the payoff values will not necessarily capture 
all consequences of a smoker-dominant convention. A society in 
which people are free to smoke will inevitably lure young people 
into addiction and inflict costs on third parties from the morbidity 
associated with smoking-related health problems and early death. 
These costs are left out of the idealized model of the game, which 
looks only to tastes and consequences for those on the front lines 
of the struggle to control public spaces. That narrow focus appears 
to dictate social indifference between smoker and nonsmoker 
dominance, since the interests of the two groups in “getting their 
way” appear to be equivalent and equally valid. Likewise, intrinsic 
payoffs to players from games that represent race and gender rela-
tions may not capture all secondary and downstream effects of 
structural inequalities that could flow from repetitive rounds of 
play over sustained periods. Lower payoffs to women within the 
 
31 Compare the discussion infra pp. 1755–56 on efficiency in games, with balanced 
arrays, suggesting that, absent externalities, there is no efficiency rationale for 
choosing one convention over another in this context. 
32 See discussion of the smoker/nonsmoker game, supra note 20. 
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division of labor or sexual harassment games might translate into 
reduced well-being for children or other undesirable social effects. 
Such consequences might justify interventions to discourage C- (or 
male-) dominant equilibria in some social situations. 
Absent negative externalities or efficiency concerns, the struggle 
over which convention will prevail would appear to come down to 
rent seeking. Assuming the decision to favor one custom over an-
other should rest on considerations other than raw favoritism, 
justifying legal intervention to turn the tables on prevailing norms 
would depend on finding some public-regarding basis for distin-
guishing between the possibilities represented by the available 
equilibria. Appeals to morality, responsibility, fairness, and right 
action could provide the grounds for regarding the status quo con-
vention as less desirable than alternatives. Indeed, the lopsided 
structure and dynamics of “Chicken”-like social interactions makes 
it hard to avoid “value judgments” about the ways these games 
should be played. Those judgments may provide the only generally 
valid basis for deciding that the law should strive to establish new 
conventions that allocate benefits to some citizens at a cost to oth-
ers. The decision to change the status quo must stem, in effect, 
from a determination that some types of interests or preferences 
should not be indulged but must be sacrificed in the name of what 
is morally right or socially just. An appeal to such impartial princi-
ples would seem to mark the only way out of the dilemma of 
partiality built into the structure of social interactions most aptly 
modeled by these games. 
Sexual harassment (see Appendix) provides a good example of 
the law’s attempt to work a sea change in conventions that previ-
ously favored men’s interests in exacting sexual favors or 
dominating the workplace but now favor women’s interests in 
avoiding those demands. The male interests sacrificed by the re-
cent norm shift are now generally regarded as unworthy of official 
protection because they have come to be seen as harmful to many 
women’s dignity and well-being.33 The law’s efforts to change the 
 
33 There is, of course, a range of conduct that potentially qualifies as sexual 
harassment under existing law, which is unsettled and ambiguous. Moreover, women’s 
preferences (and thus their payoffs) in regard to outcomes and moves in the game are 
diverse, with some suffering intensely from conduct that others may not mind at all, 
and some (eligible single women, for example) potentially gaining in some cases from 
more lenient rules for mixing business and pleasure. 
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previously reigning convention stem from abandoning a stance of 
neutrality towards the parties’ stakes in the game. 
As noted, the law can attempt to disrupt the sexual harassment 
convention by altering players’ actual payoffs through sanctions or 
penalties or by mandating transfer payments from wrongdoers to 
victims.34 Alternatively, tastes may change for reasons that are ill-
understood but may be partly influenced by changes in the law.35 
The limitations of the “deterrence” approach have already been 
discussed, and nowhere are those limitations more evident than for 
rules of interpersonal workplace conduct. The focus of my interest 
here, then, is on how law, apart from its power to sanction, might 
play a part in shifting the norms of conduct in the sexual harass-
ment context and for similar interactions that produce disparate 
payoffs and coordinate around “salient” personal or identity traits. 
Before setting out a positive theory of how law might contribute to 
the reform of these kinds of “oppressive” norms, the next Section 
offers a more general critique of McAdams’s analysis of how ex-
pressive law influences shifts in conventions and shows the 
limitations of applying the theory in this context. 
B. Changing Conventions Through Expression:  
The Limitations of McAdams’s Model 
Part IV of McAdams’s Article investigates how legal expression 
might work to change prevailing conventions for playing Hawk-
Dove games. McAdams’s analysis shows him struggling to come to 
terms with a central fact about these conventions: They represent 
stable—and thus self-perpetuating—strategies for the ongoing con-
duct of the game. These conventions are stable precisely because 
they are maintained by steps that players voluntarily and sponta-
neously take. The equilibrium is the result of individual players’ 
decisions to make moves from which they have no good reason to 
deviate. The convention is difficult to dislodge precisely because no 
self-interested player can expect to gain by changing what he is do-
ing. That is the fundamental hallmark of an equilibrium strategy. 
Unlike some other games (such as the prisoner’s dilemma), 
Hawk-Dove can fall into more than one stable conflict-free con-
 
34 See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 4. 
35 See text accompanying note 48, infra. 
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vention (corresponding to a “pure” Nash equilibrium). The payoff 
structure dictates that different players prefer different conven-
tions. Although those who do worse under the status quo 
convention (“the underdogs”) would prefer to switch to the more 
favorable regime, they won’t do what is necessary to effect that 
change. By definition, no “rational” player—regardless of whether 
he could do better under a different convention or not—will 
choose to deviate from the existing mode of play. That deviation, if 
undertaken unilaterally, will be costly relative to sticking with the 
moves dictated by the existing norm. Consider Game #1 in the Ap-
pendix (p. 1777) played according to the “natural” convention of 
C-Hawk/R-Dove. R would prefer to live under the opposite con-
vention of R-Hawk/C-Dove, which would enable him to more than 
double his payoff, from 5 to 12. R cannot get where he wants to go, 
however, without paying a steep price. Because he lacks the power 
to force C to do his bidding directly, R’s options are limited: He 
can cease playing Dove and start playing Hawk. But if C makes no 
corresponding change—and there is no objective reason why he 
should—R’s move entails sacrificing the certainty of a gain of 5 
while incurring a loss of -10. R will not ordinarily choose to do that, 
so matters will remain as they are. 
This analysis points to a feature that inevitably confronts any 
theory purporting to explain norm changes, where those changes 
are not centrally mandated and so must be effected by players’ 
voluntary choices: All routes from one equilibrium to another are 
booby-trapped with losses for any player who seeks to initiate any 
reform. The basic puzzle for any account of informal norm change 
is thus to explain how, apart from directly altering payoffs to 
“force” players to act differently, parties can be persuaded to make 
the moves necessary to bring about the shift. Because the payoff 
array dictates that any isolated, unilateral decision to deviate from 
the convention will be penalized, it is hard to see how conventions 
can be changed by the players’ self-initiated, uncoerced decisions. 
Any moves required to accomplish a switch between one equilib-
rium and another would always appear to be against each player’s 
rational self-interest. 
McAdams’s effort to show how legal expression, operating non-
coercively, might get around this problem is less than fully 
persuasive. His discussion centers almost exclusively on the dra-
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matic recent shift from a smoker-dominant to a nonsmoker-
dominant convention in public places. Central to his tale—and his 
story of how law figured in it—are two key elements: the potential 
for spatial segregation of smokers from nonsmokers and the exis-
tence of “cranks” among nonsmokers. 
In keeping with the forgoing discussion, McAdams cannot help 
but recognize that, absent coercion of smokers by punishing them 
directly, nonsmokers’ voluntary one-sided decision to defy the ex-
isting smoker-dominant convention is an unavoidable initial step in 
any sequence leading from smoker dominance to its opposite. 
Notwithstanding the announcement of an official smoking ban, the 
preexisting equilibrium erects a seemingly insurmountable barrier 
to playing by the new rule. Even if nonsmokers take the new rule 
seriously, there is no reason to believe that this step will be accom-
panied by any spontaneous change in smokers’ or nonsmokers’ 
conduct. As McAdams puts it, “The day before the state bans 
smoking in designated areas, 100% of smokers played Hawk in 
these (and all other) areas. The day after the ban, unless the law 
threatens sanctions, why would anyone expect anything different 
from smokers?”36 If, as predicted, smokers continue to play Hawk 
even in nonsmoking areas, “then it does not pay for nonsmokers to 
challenge them.”37 The law’s mere declaration of a new (unen-
forced) rule does nothing to budge players from their current 
course, because ignoring the rule continues to comport with every 
player’s best interests. 
McAdams sees the potential for spatial segregation as critical to 
moving out of this rut. For nonsmokers, the downside of switching 
from Dove to Hawk—the critical first step on the road to a new 
nonsmoker-dominant convention—is the possibility of encounter-
ing a Hawk in the form of an assertive smoker. One way to 
minimize this costly possibility is to arrange things so that non-
smokers encounter mostly their own kind. This will occur if 
nonsmokers flock together. The official designation of “nonsmok-
ing” areas facilitates segregation by allowing nonsmokers easily to 
find one another. If nonsmokers can be assured of encountering 
mostly nonsmokers, the probability of getting into a fight will de-
 
36 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1717. 
37 Id. 
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cline precipitously, and with it the costs of standing ready to play 
Hawk. In effect, spatial segregation helps cushion the cost to non-
smokers of defying the existing smoker-dominant convention by 
ensuring that nonsmoker’s willingness to go up against smokers is 
tested very infrequently. 
Unfortunately, however, segregation is a two-way street. This 
steep decline in nonsmokers’ costs of assertiveness will occur only 
if Hawkish smokers also stay away. If smokers go everywhere, 
nonsmokers will receive less than full protection from the costs of 
belligerence. But there is no obvious reason why smokers won’t go 
wherever they like. Because nonsmokers can only afford to be bold 
if their boldness is never or rarely tested, nonsmokers will not shift 
their strategy if smokers invade their turf in large numbers. All “ra-
tional” nonsmokers will back down when confronted with 
aggressive smokers, so the latter have no reason to stay away or to 
shrink from their customary aggressiveness. 
This is where “cranks” come into the picture. Cranks are defined 
as those outliers who “will play [hawk] regardless of what they ex-
pect the other to do.”38 For cranks, “the game being played is not 
Hawk-Dove” because “Hawk is the dominant strategy,” either be-
cause the gains from winning a fight are much higher than for other 
players or the costs of losing much lower.39 Although cranks, like 
all other players, still prefer their opponents to behave submis-
sively, they will stand up to assertive behavior rather than yield to 
it. Cranks are not afraid to fight.40 
According to McAdams, nonsmoking cranks are the solution to 
the problem of smoking Hawks in the nonsmoking section. Cranks 
discourage Hawks from invading nonsmoking areas because the 
possibility of encountering a crank, even if fairly low, is sufficiently 
unpleasant to induce almost all Hawkish smokers to stay away. 
McAdams insists that cranks need not be numerous to play their 
role effectively.41 Because cranks provide smokers with a reason to 
 
38 Id. at 1718 n.142. 
39 Id. 
40 For another example of crank-like behavior, see Posner’s description of the 
willingness of the destitute to flout the norms of property ownership. See Posner, 
supra note 4, at 30. Notoriously, the poor may resort to criminal activity if their stake 
in existing rules evaporates because they have no property to call their own. See id. 
41 According to McAdams, nonsmoking cranks will also tend to stay in the non-
smoking section despite their low costs (or net gains) from encountering smokers 
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avoid nonsmoking areas, smokers will begin to confine themselves 
to other areas. The two-way process of segregation proceeds apace. 
The last step in McAdams’s story sees this bilateral self-
segregation as fostering a change in expectations. The resulting 
emergence of smoke-free spaces gives smokers and nonsmokers 
alike “significant reason to wonder whether past precedent pre-
dicts future play”—that is, whether players of all stripes will 
continue to adhere to the smoker-dominant convention.42 In effect, 
smokers begin to wonder whether nonsmokers will start to resist 
and nonsmokers wonder whether smokers will continue to do so. 
As with McAdams’s account of how norms evolve in the first place, 
timing is important: Expectations and actions must change in con-
cert for players in both camps. Smokers and nonsmokers must be 
equally willing to switch their strategies when encountering their 
opposite number. If most nonsmokers begin playing Hawk and 
most smokers play Dove, that will go a long way towards shifting 
the equilibrium. The more players on both sides play the game the 
new way, the more the remaining players do best by following suit. 
The plausibility of McAdams’s account would appear to depend 
on the validity of myriad assumptions that must be evaluated em-
pirically. Whether a few well-placed cranks can succeed in inducing 
most smokers to avoid no-smoking areas would seem to depend on 
the size, attractiveness, location, and convenience of alternative 
spaces and other factors varying case by case. In addition, McAdams 
asks us to accept that the mere fact of segregation will cause play-
ers to believe their opponents will abandon the old convention in 
considerable numbers and play by the new legally ordained rule. It 
is hard to see why this should occur and impossible to know a pri-
ori whether it actually will. 
These difficulties are not central to this critique, however. 
Rather, this account identifies as the most important flaws in 
McAdams’s analysis its reliance on two key features: spatial segrega-
tion and the presence of “cranks.” To the extent that McAdams’s 
account of convention change turns on self-segregation, its potential 
application to other contexts and other games is severely limited. 
Spatial or social segregation is not a feasible prospect for many in-
                                                                                                                                       
because their costs are minimized even more by avoiding them. See McAdams, supra 
note 3, at 1719 n.142. 
42 Id. 1719–20. 
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teractions that are of the greatest societal interest. In many cases 
segregation would defeat much of the purpose of reforming pre-
vailing norms. Spatial or social segregation by race or sex is often 
regarded as an independent source of subordination that is unde-
sirable in itself. Even if temporary, segregation would often greatly 
reduce the benefits for the disfavored group of playing the game at 
all.43 
Second, reliance on the presence of cranks provides a tenuous 
basis for a generalizable theory of norm change. Although, as 
McAdams correctly states, “individuals vary continuously and 
some have idiosyncratic payoffs that produce no incentive to ever 
follow the convention,”44 cranks necessarily represent an atypical 
extreme—so much so that Hawk is a dominant strategy for them, 
which negates a fundamental assumption of the game. Because 
“crankiness” betokens a wide divergence from most players’ pref-
erences, it is safe to predict that cranks will be rare indeed among 
“underdogs” in most settings that give rise to “oppressive” norms. 
Unless cranks need only be present in small numbers, any account 
of norm shifts that assigns them a key role must be viewed with 
skepticism. 
The most important objection to reliance on cranks, however, is 
that societies need not accept cranky behavior passively. Those 
who fail to avoid conflict spontaneously represent a serious threat 
to social order and may be targeted for special measures of social 
control; these may include joint third-party sanctions such as dis-
approval, ostracism, private violence, or collective economic 
pressure.45 These measures would operate like official penalties to 
 
43 Spatial and social segregation of the sexes can be partial or can involve complex 
arrangements compatible with some cooperative interactions. And voluntary racial 
self-segregation is favored by some as a solution to the dilemmas of racial 
subordination. As a general matter, however, segregation of groups would be 
considered too controversial, too difficult to effectuate, or too costly to employ as a 
method for changing undesirable conventions. 
44 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1696 n.108. 
45 These social pressures could arguably be regarded as affecting outcomes for 
players in ways that go beyond those captured directly by the payoff array. A woman 
who complains about sexual harassment may be ostracized by family or friends, which 
adds to the costs incurred from her opponent’s retaliatory moves. A white 
restaurateur, although personally averse to serving blacks, may hesitate even more 
from fear of ostracism or recrimination. There are other examples in which norms are 
reinforced by outside pressure. The source of the collective impulse to shore up 
conventions is not well-understood; it may represent a response to the threat to the 
stability of norms created by the diversity of player preferences. 
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alter cranks’ payoff array and enhance the costs of assertiveness, 
thus ensuring that moves reflect not just the players’ preferences 
but the interests of the community’s dominant groups. By selec-
tively ratcheting up sanctions for troublemakers, groups can 
“reinvert” the order of preferences for the outliers who threaten 
the stability of established conventions. That cranks can be and of-
ten are effectively “neutralized” by such devices undermines the 
notion that cranky behavior will be sufficiently robust to fuel ob-
served shifts in conventions. 
In any event, the manner in which cranks function in McAdams’s 
smoking example is necessarily of limited interest because their role 
is not independent of the potential for spatial self-segregation. In 
McAdams’s account, spatial segregation and cranks are factors that 
work in concert to bring about the smoker convention change, and 
each component is necessary to the story. Thus even if cranks are 
not uncommon in analogous situations, McAdams’s account is too 
parochial to explain much norm change. 
The case of sexual harassment (see Appendix, p. 1779) illustrates 
the limited generalizability of McAdams’s analysis. The problem of 
harassment arises only because men and women are thrown to-
gether at work. Sex segregation in the workplace would certainly 
“solve” the problem of harassment by reducing the occasions for 
conflictual encounters. But even if temporary segregation were a 
price worth paying for an enduring change in norms, it is difficult 
to construct an account analogous to McAdams’s smoking story for 
how sex segregation plus cranks might hasten the shift from the 
male-dominant status quo to a harassment-free environment.46 
A role for cranks in changing sexual harassment norms is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, as predicted, they will be rare. The 
payoffs for female cranks would have to diverge quite dramatically 
from those typical for most women, with the expected benefits of 
resisting and/or complaining far exceeding the downside risk of go-
ing head to head with a vengeful and insistent male harasser. This 
could happen, as McAdams suggests, if a woman’s gains from “get-
ting her way” in a fight exceeded her losses from a rout. Since the 
 
46 Even if such an account could be devised, many feminists would insist that 
transitional segregation would carry intolerable costs that render it an undesirable 
device for helping resolve conflicting male and female priorities at work. See 
discussion supra note 43. 
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outcome of any given fight is not predetermined, however, the 
Hawk/Hawk payoffs supplied in game theoretic arrays generally 
represent the expected costs of coming into conflict with an oppo-
nent. This in turn depends on the probability of a positive or 
negative outcome as well as the utilities derived from each state. 
McAdams states that the payoffs supplied in his arrays are based 
on the assumption “that a player who ‘fights’ wins half the time.”47 
That scenario may be unrealistic in the world of sexual harassment, 
however. If men win fights most of the time—a not implausible as-
sumption—fighting would only be worthwhile if the underlying 
benefits to a woman of winning a fight exceeded the costs of losing 
many times over. Although occasional women may be so attached 
to their virtue or unattached to their jobs that this ratio obtains, 
such women will likely be few and far between. 
But even if those women do exist, it is still not obvious how 
these isolated outliers could turn the tide on the entrenched male-
dominant convention. As long as cranks are rare, men will encoun-
ter them quite infrequently and it will remain in most men’s 
interest to stick with the established convention and play Hawk. 
Likewise, because the probability of encountering a Hawklike male 
would still be exceedingly high, it would remain in the ordinary 
woman’s interests to stick with Dove. In McAdams’s example, 
cranks’ rebellious behavior works by enhancing self-segregation: 
Staying away is an easy and, presumably, low-cost way for smokers 
to avoid costly cranks while still continuing to smoke. Spatial seg-
regation then leads to the expectation that nonsmokers will convert 
to Hawk. Even if this scenario is plausible (which it may not be), it 
is hard to see how a parallel sequence would operate in the har-
assment context. Even if women surrounded themselves with 
women and the female population was peppered with a few cranks, 
it is not obvious that men would consider it in their interest to stay 
away since—unlike with smoking—self-segregation would prevent 
them from having their cake (avoiding nasty conflict) and eating it 
too (enjoying the benefits of Hawklike harassment, which requires 
access to women). Even if they did stay away (and the employer let 
them), it is not obvious how separation of the sexes would operate 
 
47 McAdams, supra note 3, at 1719 n.142. 
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to generate analogous expectations of women’s future aggressive-
ness in would-be harassers’ minds. 
V. NORM CHANGE AND EXPRESSIVE LAW:  
AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
This Section attempts to improve on McAdams’s story by put-
ting forward an alternative account of how changes in informal 
norms can occur. The analysis dispenses with reliance on the two 
problematic elements—the potential for segregation and the pres-
ence of cranks—identified above. The alternative theory put forth 
here is especially concerned with supplying a more plausible 
explanation for recent historical shifts in “oppressive” norms—that 
is, conventions that arise in unbalanced games coordinated around 
fairly rigid roles. 
Although McAdams’s analysis seems inadequate to the task of 
explaining how legal expression can help dislodge established con-
ventions in Hawk-Dove type interactions in general—and in those 
giving rise to oppressive conventions in particular—the fact re-
mains that such conventions do sometimes undergo dramatic 
reversals. Relations between racial groups and the sexes have been 
areas of active social ferment and our intuition is that direct en-
forcement of legal mandates has played at most an ancillary role in 
effecting these developments. Changes in tastes and preferences, 
with corresponding shifts in payoff values, have almost certainly 
had an important influence, although the processes that have fu-
eled these changes are themselves somewhat mysterious and cry 
out for further explanation.48 Although McAdams’s failure to find a 
credible place for legal expression in explaining norm shifts is dis-
couraging, we should not so readily give up on a role for expressive 
law in fomenting social change in these areas. The suggestion here 
is that law in its expressive capacity has figured to some extent in 
these movements for social reform, but that McAdams’s analysis 
does not capture what is really going on when norms begin to favor 
the previously disfavored. 
The account presented here, although not limited in application 
to “oppressive” norms, nonetheless has special power in explaining 
changes in these types of conventions because it taps into the po-
 
48 See discussions supra notes 25 and 32. 
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litical psychology of those who live and suffer under customs that 
perpetuate persistent “identity-based” hierarchies. That psychol-
ogy makes those conventions particularly vulnerable to alteration 
by the mechanisms described. 
The alternative account proceeds from the assumption that real 
human beings often deviate from the strictly rational behavior that 
classic game theory takes for granted. That the rational actor 
model often fails to explain human decisionmaking is a persistent 
theme of recent work in behavioral economics.49 Our analysis of 
McAdams’s account of norm change reveals that the assumption of 
players’ strict adherence to rational self-interest makes it difficult 
to explain how conventions representing stable game-theoretic 
equilibria ever come to change. By definition it is in no player’s in-
terest to defy them or to take the steps necessary to change them. 
But this raises the possibility that perhaps norm changes occur be-
cause people sometimes act against rational self-interest. 
How could acting against narrow self-interest induce a change in 
the normative strategies for playing the games of interest here? Ex-
tending insights found in the work of Edna Ullman-Margalit 
suggests a possible answer.50 Starting from the commonplace ob-
servation that stable conventions in many games yield unequal 
payoffs to opposing players, Ullman-Margalit examines examples 
of games that have settled into what she describes as a “status quo 
of inequality which is in a game-theoretical equilibrium.”51 She des-
ignates the conventions for playing these games “norms of 
partiality.”52 She suggests that many norms of partiality, despite 
their game-theoretic stability, are potentially vulnerable to dis-
placement in real life,53 and she describes such conventions as 
“strategically unstable.”54 Although recognizing that such conven-
 
49 See Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (summarizing 
recent work reaching this conclusion). 
50 See Edna Ullman-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (1977). 
51 Id. at 163. 
52 Id. at 134. 
53 See id. at 162–63. As discussed above and in other sources, game-theoretically 
stable conventions are vulnerable to destabilization and displacement through the 
operation of “rational” evolutionary mechanisms in combination with mutations, 
“mistakes,” and random noise. See, e.g., Bendor & Swistak, supra note 26 
(summarizing theories of the robustness of equilibria). See other sources, supra note 
26. Without denying those mechanisms, Ullman-Margalit does not make them the 
focus of her analysis. 
54 Ullman-Margalit, supra note 50, at 163 (emphasis omitted). 
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tions satisfy the strict Nash equilibrium condition that no player, 
including the “underdog” disfavored by the convention, has a ra-
tional incentive to deviate from the convention of play, she 
identifies the instability of such conventions as stemming from 
some players’ irrational willingness to deviate from them. That is, a 
player may elect to defy the convention even if doing so is against 
his own self-interest. 
Why would he do that? Ullman-Margalit’s discussion suggests a 
distinction, important for our purposes, between the psychological 
motivation behind such a move and the strategic advantage that 
may eventually be gained from it. To illustrate, consider the follow-
ing array: 
B 
 C1 C2 
R1 2, 1 0, 0 
 
 
A R2 0, 0 1, 2 
 
Suppose the status quo convention for playing this game is (R1, 
C1). This is an equilibrium strategy, from which no player has rea-
son to deviate so long as others adhere to it. Nonetheless, B might 
intensely dislike that equilibrium. One reason he might dislike it, 
Ullman-Margalit suggests, is that he assigns an independent value 
to improving his position relative to his opponent. Or he may value 
equality for its own sake. He may feel so strongly that he is willing 
to move unilaterally towards a more equal combination of payoffs 
even at the cost of forgoing benefits or incurring costs as reflected 
in the values in the array. In the game above, B might decide to 
switch from C1 (with payoff 1) to C2 (with payoff 0). Assuming 
that A will at first continue to play as before (that is, to adhere to 
the R1 strategy), that move will succeed in effecting B’s immediate 
goal of making payoffs to the parties more equal and improving B’s 
welfare relative to A’s.  
Although it can be debated whether the “preferences” that drive 
B’s moves under this account simply represent an alternative form 
of rational choice or a deviation from “true rationality,” that dis-
pute is unimportant for our purposes. Rather, as Ullman-Margalit 
suggests, this example relaxes the common game-theoretic assump-
tion that each participant rank-orders his own outcomes “in 
isolation from the interaction situation, or in a sense even prior to 
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it.”55 The example here permits players to look to the overall pat-
tern of payoffs in assigning a rank order to states of affairs and 
particular moves. Those concerns may dictate decisions taken in 
defiance of immediate “rational” self-interest, as reflected in the 
utilities assigned to each party in the array. What matters is the 
possibility that people may look beyond what is in the game for 
them alone; they may be motivated by something other than a nar-
row calculus of self-interest. 
The “motives” that impel B’s decision to move from C1 to C2 
are not the end of the story, because B’s move presents the poten-
tial for strategic advantage more narrowly defined. If A becomes 
convinced that B prefers “equality in misery” to the preexisting 
inequality despite the former being worse for B, A is faced with a 
dilemma. He can make do with his lower payoff under R1/C2. Or 
he can try to make the best of the situation by moving to R2, which 
has the effect of raising payoffs for both players. But that move 
also has the effect of reintroducing inequality, where that inequal-
ity now favors B. This sequence reveals that by doing something 
that is “irrationally” self-defeating in the short term, B has suc-
ceeded in bringing about a “new and advantageous . . . status quo” 
in which the tables of partiality are turned, but this time to his 
benefit.56 B has managed to effect this reversal, paradoxically, only 
by persuading his opponent that he is “so indignant at the [un-
equal] status quo that he actually prefers anything, including an 
‘equality in misery’ to it.”57 
A number of features in Ullman-Margalit’s discussion point the 
way toward an account of norm change for the games that are the 
focus of this Comment—an account that offers a potential entry 
point for the influence of expressive law. First, Ullman-Margalit’s 
analysis has the virtue of confronting head-on the coordination 
problem that confounds any self-executing shift between stable 
conventions. As Ullman-Margalit suggests, it is clear that no ra-
tional and self-interested player in the games she analyzes will 
unilaterally take the steps necessary to convert to a new equilib-
rium even if that equilibrium would ultimately prove better for 
him. That player will not move without a simultaneous change on 
 
55 Id. at 146. 
56 Id. at 167–68 (emphasis omitted). 
57 Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted). 
WAXBOOK.DOC 11/20/00 6:06 PM 
1766 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 86:1731 
the part of his opponent. A norm change requires that both parties 
deviate from the status quo. But a simultaneous change is not in 
the cards because “there is every reason to expect [the opponent] 
not to cooperate.”58 Ullman-Margalit recognizes that the solution 
to this dilemma is to be found in identifying “some method of in-
ducing the other party to choose in one’s favour.”59 Moreover, 
“[t]his inducement will be achieved once one succeeds in affecting 
the other party’s expectations concerning one’s own behaviour.”60 
She suggests that a player “will be able to influence the other’s ex-
pectations” only through “visibly and persuasively constraining 
[his] own behaviour.”61 In her example, B must somehow succeed 
in convincing A “that he is committed, in a binding and irrevocable 
way, to abandon the status quo.”62 B must indicate his readiness to 
make “an unconditional choice of column 2,” thereby turning “an 
originally four-state situation . . . to only a two-state situation.”63 
The challenge for B, then, boils down to making a credible case 
that he is firmly committed to a move against self-interest. 
How might a player accomplish this? The work of economist 
Robert Frank is suggestive.64 Frank describes circumstances in 
which individuals might wish to make “a binding commitment to 
behave in a way” that is “contrary to self-interest.”65 Players in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game would be better off if both decided to co-
operate. Yet defection is the only “rational” strategy for all 
players, and defect/defect the only stable equilibrium. Playing the 
game in a way that benefits all players simultaneously therefore 
requires players to make choices that depart from immediate self-
interest. What is needed is a device that commits people to mutual 
cooperation, but without making them vulnerable to exploitation. 
Frank’s idea is that the emotions—and specifically the moral sen-
timents—serve as that device in many real-life settings. Players’ 
interest in fairness and reciprocity, as well as their intrinsic sense of 
 
58 Id. at 166. 
59 Id. at 165. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 166 (emphasis omitted). 
63 Id. at 165. 
64 See Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the 
Emotions (1988). 
65 Id. at 47. 
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gratitude and indignation towards those who aid or betray them, 
impel them to cooperate with others, but only when other persons 
show willingness to cooperate with them. The sentiments that 
compel players to engage in conditional cooperation are also evi-
dent to observers and help communicate a commitment to behave 
in this way. The moral sentiments thus play the dual role of actu-
ally ensuring adherence to actions that are not strictly rational, and 
also of signaling to others the serious intention to take those ac-
tions. Frank implies that the best way to persuade others of one’s 
firm determination to act against interest is through devices that 
are well known to impel such actions. Emotions familiar to all, if 
overtly displayed, operate as a commitment device that is both re-
liable and credible. 
Frank’s ideas about the role of the moral sentiments have poten-
tial application to the social interactions under consideration here. 
Frank’s theory recognizes that although acting against rational self-
interest may appear costly in the short run, it can yield benefits 
eventually by facilitating fruitful cooperation.66 In our case, moves 
that are costly in the present can produce gains in the future. In 
both cases, emotions play a key role in motivating the actions 
against interest. Sentiments such as envy, outrage, indignation, 
gratitude, vengefulness, or a desire for fair treatment both impel 
the self-defeating course of action and signal a party’s commitment 
to it. 
Ullman-Margalit’s discussion of the strategic instability of 
“norms of partiality,” although underdeveloped, has much in 
common with Frank’s insights about the role of emotions in signal-
ing commitment and achieving coordination. In discussing her 
example of a norm of partiality, she suggests that “underdog” 
group members can only realize their desired goal of changing to a 
more favorable convention by persuading “top dog” opponents of 
their readiness to unilaterally abandon the current strategy despite 
the losses this entails. If the top dogs believe that underdogs are 
fully committed to acting against interest come what may, they will 
do well to alter their strategy as well. Because, as Ullman-Margalit 
recognizes, the underdog’s commitment to defying the convention 
 
66 See, e.g., id. at 51–52 (drawing the distinction between immediate psychological 
motive and ultimate strategic effect). 
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will effectively reduce a “four box” option to two, the opponents’ best 
choice will be to abandon an aggressive posture and adopt a more 
submissive role. Ullman-Margalit identifies the moral sentiment of 
indignation as playing a key role in effecting this progression. B’s con-
templation of his inferior relative position or the unequal state of 
affairs fuels his resentment. His indignation prompts him to aban-
don the position that perpetuates this obnoxious situation even at 
great cost to himself. The top dogs are acutely aware that the un-
derdogs feel resentment and are likely to act on their feelings in a 
predictable way. 
Although Ullman-Margalit does not unpack the sequence care-
fully, her discussion suggests that the underdog’s outrage plays the 
dual role suggested above: It impels that party’s shift in strategy, 
and it provides the basis for the opponents’ belief that the under-
dog will stick to his course despite personal sacrifice. The emotions 
felt by the previously submissive group also function “horizontally” 
to foster group solidarity. Such solidarity serves to facilitate coor-
dinated action and to speed change. If some underdogs advertise 
their commitment to defeating the status quo, others will be em-
boldened and encouraged to follow. The greater the number of 
underdogs joining the movement for change, the more costly it is 
for members of the previously dominant group to continue on their 
current course. The expectation that underdogs will act en masse in 
defiance of the existing convention will tend to weaken opponents’ 
commitment to it by raising the intolerable specter of conflict. 
Although she does not label them as such, what could be termed 
“moral sentiments” or “moral attitudes” are critical to Ullman-
Margalit’s account of how players unsettle game-theoretically sta-
ble equilibria.67 She ascribes the underdog’s willingness to disrupt 
the status quo to his desire for equality or improved relative posi-
tion and acknowledges that strong human emotions drive these 
desires. She also recognizes, in keeping with Frank’s analysis, that 
the ultimate result of putting these emotions to work is strategic. 
The end-point of the disruption is not greater equality of resources 
overall but a convention that effectively reverses the positions of 
the players. 
 
67 See, e.g., Ullman-Margalit, supra note 50, at 155, 165–168. 
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Although this analysis suggests that the scenario should be re-
garded as a mere battle of wills or a power struggle that rewards 
the party willing to sustain the heaviest losses, those are not the 
terms on which movements for social change actually proceed in 
real life. Rather, the push for reform is routinely informed by re-
course to moral conceptions of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice. The thrust of the rhetoric ordinarily employed by critics 
of prevailing social practices in realms of sex and race is that cer-
tain methods for gaining advantage through private dealings are 
morally wrong, deserve condemnation, and should be off-limits. 
People are not supposed to use their position at work to gain sex-
ual favors. One should not satisfy one’s personal preferences by 
excluding blacks from privately owned public accommodations. 
Husbands are not supposed to gain the upper hand over their wives 
through superior bargaining power. And so on. 
These insights point to the pivotal importance of the moral ele-
ment in reactions to the norms that govern social life. As already 
suggested,68 it is important to any movement for social change to 
persuade others that not all conventions are equally desirable. But 
desirable to whom? Because it provides a requisite principle of im-
partiality that allows proponents to rise above the appearance of 
seeking advantage at others’ expense, moral argument is a key 
element in the battle to change norms. This suggests that social 
movements cannot entirely dispense with moralistic judgments. 
The moralistic character of players’ motives and justifications 
plays both a psychological and a rhetorical role; both are vital to 
players’ perceptions and behavior within the game. The emotions 
the status quo elicits in the disfavored class stem from the percep-
tion of being treated wrongly or unjustly. Resentment is directed 
not at losing out as such but at wrongfully imposed disadvantage. 
That the particular arrangement at issue is not only unequal but 
also unfair helps resolve the tension between the motivating senti-
ments and the “table-turning” final outcome. 
The rejection of an exclusive reliance on self-interest in favor of 
an abstract concern with justice and right also confers an important 
strategic advantage, as it enhances the credibility of the underdog’s 
commitment to act “irrationally.” If the underdog’s motive is a 
 
68 See supra pp. 1763–66. 
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mere selfish desire to change places with favored players, he might 
abandon his strategy if the costs of adhering to it grow too great. 
The perception that a desire to gain advantage is at the root of the 
push for social change invites an opponent to ratchet up the costs 
of defying convention, as high costs can be expected to weaken re-
solve. It makes more sense to act against self-interest, however, if 
the objective is not to gratify the self but to vindicate principle. But 
the devotion to principle cannot be shaken by imposing losses, if 
avoiding these losses is not the reason for commitment. A moral 
rationale thus provides a far more credible platform for convincing 
the opponent of one’s willingness to endure whatever costs may be 
imposed. By suggesting that draconian countermoves won’t work, 
a moral justification discourages escalation and encourages the 
conclusion that there is no choice but to give in to the desired 
change. In sum, the commitment to broader moral principles, and 
the link to the sentiments triggered by commitment to those prin-
ciples, may well prove essential to the effectiveness of many efforts 
to reform “norms of partiality.” 
Assuming this account is plausible, how might legal expression 
facilitate or shape this process? In venturing a guess, it is important 
to note that the picture suggested here relies on a richer model of 
human motivation and behavior than McAdams sees the need to 
employ in his account. It assigns a place to moral sentiments and 
emotions elicited by wrongful or unjust treatment, and it accepts 
that people will sometimes act unselfishly from morally inspired 
motives. Understanding how law might influence this dynamic may 
require recognizing an expressive power for law that goes beyond 
imparting information, focusing citizens’ attention, or fostering ex-
pectations about behavior. Experience suggests that law might 
possess a hortatory or normative power—that is, it might possess a 
capacity to influence what citizens regard as morally justified or 
right. Although as yet poorly understood, this aspect of law may 
have something to do with law’s ability to influence the moral 
struggle over convention reform. 
By announcing rules that run contrary to existing informal con-
ventions (as with laws against sexual harassment or race discrim-
ination), the law may add normative weight to outcries by private 
citizens, groups, or organizations against existing arrangements. 
The law’s imprimatur may embolden and encourage underdogs to 
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take personal risks in defiance of existing conventions. Any pre-
sumption, however mild, that law and morality coincide fuels the 
underdogs’ conviction that they are justified in acting against inter-
est to vindicate higher values and reinforces the opposing groups’ 
expectation that underdogs will continue to defy the status quo. 
The desire to avoid costly conflict will be the opposition’s principal 
reason for its willingness to switch strategies, but the highly moral-
ized character of the struggle will also help undermine the 
opponents’ determination to continue on the present course. 
The law’s publicity function can also facilitate concerted effort 
by calling attention to the possibility of a different convention and 
by putting a seal of approval on a state of affairs that runs contrary 
to the status quo. By publicly advertising and affirming the “right-
ness” of the new convention, the law can raise awareness of the 
injustice of the existing regime, add momentum to private resent-
ments, and provide a focal point around which players can rally 
and affirm their commitment to change. By thus encouraging and 
advertising rebels’ strength, sincerity, and determination, the law 
helps weaken opposition to reform. Although effective sanctions 
will certainly speed this process along, this account suggests that 
the communicative power of law can have some effect as well. 
The alternative theory sketched here improves on McAdams’s 
account in a number of ways. One advantage is that it does not as-
sign a crucial role to cranks. Norm changes can be spearheaded by 
players who, although holding a range of preferences, do not differ 
much from the average player in the costs they incur from conflict. 
It is not the lower expected costs of conflict, but the countervailing 
emotional, psychological, or moral commitments to change that 
make underdogs willing to face the risks of a fight. They will fight 
even though they know that they could well lose, at least on the ini-
tial rounds. Whether, as noted, this is best conceptualized as an 
effective “crank-like” modification of players’ payoffs or an exam-
ple of unselfish behavior69 is irrelevant for our purposes: The 
critical difference lies in providing a more authentic and accurate 
understanding of the political psychology of norm change. The cen-
tral point is that those disfavored by the existing status quo must 
convince themselves to engage in self-sacrifice as the only route 
 
69 See supra pp. 1754–60. 
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towards a “better world.” The main impetus for defiance is the in-
dignation engendered by unfair and unjust treatment and a 
conviction that the status quo is morally wrong. Emotional, psycho-
logical, or moral commitments, not a strictly rational cost-benefit 
calculus, mediate the behaviors that will ultimately enshrine a new 
social order. Those commitments spur willingness to act despite 
considerable personal costs. 
Another advantage of this account is that it is more consistent 
with historical and social reality. Moralistic rhetoric and appeals to 
justice are a pervasive hallmark of movements to reform or abolish 
oppressive norms. This story explains the observed patterns by 
showing how moral sentiments motivate the steps victims must 
take and also mold oppressors’ expectations. Second, in assigning a 
key place to the willingness of underdogs to compromise immedi-
ate self-interest on behalf of their goals, the account is consistent 
with a strong role for self-sacrificial leadership and “martyrs to the 
cause”—a pattern that comports with the history of the twentieth-
century civil rights and feminist movements. The willingness of 
high-profile leaders to incur personal costs serves as a coordination 
device that inspires the rank and file to similar sacrifice. And with-
out such mass sacrifice there can be no norm change. 
Finally, this account suggests an explanation for the paradox that 
the very conventions which by virtue of their “oppressiveness” ap-
pear particularly resistant to subversion may in fact prove 
especially vulnerable to destabilization. The examples of oppres-
sive unbalanced games in the Appendix have in common that 
underdogs lose more than their opponents from conflict. The pay-
offs are such that players who gain least from the status quo also 
stand to suffer most from defying it. But the greater their self-
interested costs of conflict, the greater the barrier to underdogs’ 
unsettling the dominant convention by rebelling against it. This 
pattern would appear to pose formidable obstacles to reform. In-
deed, Edna Ullman-Margalit herself despairs of the prospect of 
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changing game-theoretically stable conventions in which the route 
out entails significantly greater losses for one party than the other.70 
This analysis shows why her pessimism may miss the mark. Re-
cent history suggests that “oppressive” conventions that develop in 
situations with very lopsided payoffs—including those that pose 
significantly greater downside risks for disruptive underdogs—have 
not proved particularly stable, at least in the long term. The very 
fact that disfavored nonconformists potentially face egregious 
losses—and losses greater than opponents’—may both add to the 
underdogs’ moralistic fervor and make that fervor more credible. 
The prospect of greater losses means greater self-sacrifice. But 
greater self-sacrifice signals greater moral seriousness. The more 
self-interest must be compromised to effect change, the more likely 
it is that moral commitment and not just self-interest is at work. 
But if moral commitment is the true motive, the more likely that 
the underdog will stand firm despite considerable personal costs. 
The degree of oppressiveness and the effectiveness of the commit-
ment strategy thus play into one another, fueling the process of 
reform. 
In addition to disparities in payoffs, the intransigence of role as-
signments that is the hallmark of the most oppressive norms may 
also contribute to those norms’ instability by reinforcing the un-
derdogs’ resolve. It is harder to stir up moral indignation about 
temporary disadvantages that are voluntarily assumed than about 
those imposed by circumstance. The more inflexible the role as-
signments within the prevailing convention, the more entrenched 
and enduring are the disadvantages it creates. Greater injustice 
produces greater determination to change it. 
 
70 See Ullman-Margalit, supra note 50, at 161. In commenting on this matrix 
B 
 C1 C2 
R1 10, 6 4,-30 
 
 
 
 
A R2 5, 4 8, 8 
 
Ullman-Margalit explains that 
the state represented by the top left R1-C1, which is neither equitable nor 
optimal for [B] (who would obviously have preferred state R2-C2) is 
nevertheless a game-theoretical equilibrium which is at the same time stable by 
our [strategic] standards as well: it is on no account susceptible to threats. [A] 
enjoys it, while [B] is intimidated from abandoning it by the fear of getting -30. 
Id. 
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If we accept that law can operate expressively to speed and 
strengthen these developments, then this analysis suggests that ex-
pressive law might be particularly effective in helping change the 
most oppressive norms. The implication is that even where customs 
and interests are most entrenched and views most polarized—
which is also where enforcement may prove most difficult, costly, 
or imperfect—changes in law might be well worth pursuing. The 
history of the civil rights and feminist movements bear out these 
intuitions. Many of the laws enacted to effect change in these areas 
have been enforced imperfectly or only with great difficulty. This 
analysis suggests they may have been worth enacting despite these 
limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The capacity of governments to deter conduct by directly threat-
ening and imposing sanctions is limited by burdensome costs of 
enforcement and imperfect detection, prosecution, and proof. 
Drawing on law in its expressive capacity is a potentially less oner-
ous way to bring about desirable social change. Because 
governments should opt in favor of employing the expressive 
power of law over its deterrent power, it is imperative to under-
stand how law can produce change expressively if possible. This 
Comment offers one account of how entrenched private norms of 
behavior can change despite their seeming stability, and how legal 
rules can influence that change. It suggests that laws against op-
pressive private behavior may at times be worth enacting despite 
formidable obstacles to conventional modes of enforcement. 
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APPENDIX 
Game #1 
C 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    8, 5  5, 15 
 
 
R Hawk -12, 2 -10,-2 
 
 Cooperation Conflict R dominant C dominant 
Total utility 
(R + C) 
13 -12 14 20 
R utility 8 -10 12 5 
C utility 5 -2 2 15 
 
 
Expected payoffs given a 50% chance opponent will play 
Hawk/Dove: 
 
R from Dove = 8 + 5 = 13 
R from Hawk = 12 - 10 = 2 
 
C from Dove = 5 + 2 = 7 
C from Hawk =15 - 2 = 13 
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Game #2 
C 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    8, 6  0, 11 
 
 
R Hawk 10,-2 -10,-5 
 
 Cooperation Conflict R dominant C dominant 
Total utility 
(R + C) 
14 -15 8 11 
R utility 8 -10 10 0 
C utility 6 -5 -2 11 
 
 
Expected payoffs given a 50% chance opponent will play 
Hawk/Dove: 
 
R from Dove = 8 + 0 = 8 
R from Hawk = 10 - 10 = 0 
 
C from Dove = 6 - 2 = 4 
C from Hawk =11 - 5 = 6 
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Sexual Harassment Game 
Dove for men is to refrain from harassment/retaliation. 
Dove for women is to yield (give in, tolerate, or leave job). 
 
Hawk for men is to harass and/or retaliate. 
Hawk for women is to resist (refuse and/or complain). 
* * * 
Dove/Dove outcome is compromise (for example, each takes 
turns playing Hawk to the other’s Dove, or getting his/her way half 
of the time). 
Hawk/Dove (male/female) is for man to harass, woman to yield. 
Hawk/Dove (female/male) is for women to (stand ready) to re-
sist/complain, men to refrain from  harassment/retaliation. 
Hawk/Hawk is for men to harass/retaliate, women to re-
sist/complain. 
* * * 
C (male) 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    0, 5  -3, 12  
R (female) Hawk 13,-1 -20,-5 
 
 “Cooperation” Conflict R dominant C dominant 
Total utility 
(R + C) 
5 -25 12 9 
R utility 0 -20 13 -3 
C utility 5 -5 -1 12 
 
Expected payoffs given 50% chance opponent will play 
Hawk/Dove: 
 
R from Dove = 0 - 3 = -3 
R from Hawk = 13 - 20 = -7 
 
C from Dove = 5 - 1 = 4 
C from Hawk = 12 - 5 = 7 
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Division of Labor Game 
Hawk is to do paid but no unpaid work (for example, domestic 
labor). 
Dove is to do unpaid work (and, or instead of, paid work). 
 
C (male) 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    8, 6  -3, 13  
R (female) Hawk 11, 2 -3, 0 
 
 “Cooperation” Conflict R dominant C dominant 
Total utility 
(R + C) 
14 -3 13 16 
R utility 8 -3 11 3 
C utility 6 0 2 13 
 
Expected payoffs given 50% chance opponent will play 
Hawk/Dove: 
 
R from Dove = 8 + 3 = 11 
R from Hawk = 11 - 3 = 8 
 
C from Dove = 6 + 2 = 8 
C from Hawk = 13 + 0 = 13 
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Public Accomodation Game 
Assume that segregation is neither mandated nor illegal, but that 
majority group customers shun integration. 
 
Hawk for R is to insist upon accommodation. 
Hawk for C is to refuse accommodation. 
 
Dove for R is to avoid majority-owned establishments. 
Dove for C is to accommodate minority group customers. 
 
Assume Dove/Dove is a “split the difference” compromise: R 
avoids half the time, C accommodates half the time. 
  
C (majority) 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove    7, 6  0, 12  
R (minority) Hawk 10,-2 0,4 
 
 “Cooperation” Conflict R dominant C dominant 
Total utility 
(R + C) 
13 -14 8 12 
R utility 7 -10 10 0 
C utility 6 -4 -2 12 
 
Expected payoffs given 50% chance opponent will play 
Hawk/Dove: 
 
R from Dove = 7 + 0 = 7 
R from Hawk = 10 - 10 = 0 
 
C from Dove = 6 - 2 = 4 
C from Hawk = 12 - 4 = 8 
 
